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Christopher J. O’Leary

Unemployment after
Welfare Reform
T

he Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
(PRWORA) of 1996 changed welfare
in the United States by establishing
Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families (TANF). This law introduced
lifetime limits and work requirements
for continued TANF benefit eligibility.
With employment the key to making
TANF work, two public employment
programs are expected to help maintain
labor force participation during periods
of joblessness: unemployment insurance
(UI), which provides temporary partial
wage replacement to the involuntarily
unemployed, and the Employment
Service (ES), which provides jobmatching services for job seekers and
employers.
The Upjohn Institute recently
evaluated the use of UI and ES
by recent TANF leavers, based on
program administrative data from four
of the nine largest states ranked by
population size (O’Leary and Kline
2008, forthcoming). We examined the
incidence of unemployment and the rates
of UI application, eligibility, and benefit
receipt. We also studied the correlation
between UI receipt, ES participation, and
self-sufficiency for recent TANF leavers.
Characteristics of Unemployed
TANF Leavers
Our study used administrative data
from Florida, Georgia, Michigan,

and Ohio. Panels were constructed
based on all adult TANF leavers in the
administrative data during time frames
that varied somewhat across the states.
Data from all four states included the
year 2000, however. The panels were
constructed to have at least 12 calendar
quarters of data after TANF exit to
observe UI and ES program use and labor
market transitions. The data for analysis
included of a total of 322,036 adults
leaving TANF for employment.
Among TANF leavers in the fourstate pooled sample, 253,189 (79
percent) experienced a new spell of
unemployment within three years. The
demographic characteristics of the
UI applicants among the unemployed
included 34 percent youths (18–24) and
58 percent prime-age persons (25–44);
82 percent females; 37 percent whites, 60
percent African Americans, and 2 percent
Hispanics. In nominal dollars, quarterly
earnings among all newly unemployed
TANF leavers averaged over the three
years before TANF exit were $1,414, and
average quarterly earnings from TANF
exit to the new spell of unemployment
were $1,772.
UI Application
In times of normal labor market
conditions, the UI application rate for
Americans ranges between two-thirds
and three-quarters of all the jobless.
Among the 253,189 newly unemployed
TANF leavers in the pooled four-state

Employment Research
sample, 61,458 applied for UI, yielding
a mean UI application rate in the pooled
sample of 24 percent. That means less
than one-quarter of all newly unemployed
TANF leavers applied for UI benefits.
Compared to nonapplicants, TANF
leavers who applied for UI included
higher proportions of people who are
prime aged, are African American,
have dependent children, have higher
earnings before UI application, have
more prior work experience, and have
prior employment in construction,
manufacturing, wholesale trade, or
administration.1 Higher UI application
rates were also observed in areas with
higher or faster-rising unemployment.
The more than 75 percent of newly
unemployed TANF leavers who failed
to apply for UI were more likely
to be young and white, and to have
lower earnings before a new spell of
unemployment, fewer calendar quarters
with employment before TANF exit, and
recent prior employment in the industries
of retail trade, educational service, health
care, or hospitality.
UI Eligibility
Unemployment insurance eligibility
rules ensure that beneficiaries are
strongly attached to the labor force and
are temporarily jobless involuntarily
and through no fault of their own.
To initially qualify for UI, a claimant
must have sufficient prior earnings and
employment—these are called monetary
eligibility conditions. For the year 2000,
base-period earnings requirements in the
four states ranged from $1,872 in Georgia
to $3,400 in Florida. Nonmonetary
eligibility rules prohibit quits and
discharge for misconduct or other causes
justifiable by an employer. Employer
discharge for cause is usually related to
frequent tardiness, unexplained absences,
misconduct, or poor job performance.
For the year 2000, base-period earnings
requirements in the four states studied
ranged from $1,872 in Georgia to $3,400
in Florida. Table 1 compares results from
our study to evidence from previous
research.
Among TANF leavers who became
newly unemployed and applied for UI
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benefits, 87 percent were initially eligible
for UI based on monetary requirements
in the four-state pooled data. Those
meeting monetary eligibility conditions
were more likely to be male, prime aged,
highly educated, have prior employment
in the industries of wholesale trade and
real estate, and less likely to have been
employed in retail trade. Previous studies
estimate monetary eligibility in the range
of 75–90 percent (Table 1).
The rate of nonmonetary eligibility
was estimated to be 44 percent. Among
newly unemployed TANF leavers who
applied for UI benefits, those meeting
nonmonetary eligibility requirements
had larger sample proportions of males,
Hispanics, and those with higher
educational attainment. For TANF
leavers, higher rates of voluntary job
quits and employer justified dismissals
resulted in lower rates of nonmonetary
eligibility. Among newly unemployed

Our data suggest that
application for UI is a
pathway to reemployment
services, even if cash UI
benefits are not forthcoming
TANF leavers who applied for UI, 17
percent quit their prior jobs while 33
percent were fired. Within these groups,
those who quit had larger sample
proportions of females; whites; members
of the industry groups retail trade, hotels
and restaurants, and health care; and
members of services occupations. Those
who were discharged were more likely to
be young, female, and African American,
and to have had prior employment in
the industries of retail trade; finance,
insurance, and real estate; health care;
and hotels and restaurants. Previous
studies estimate nonmonetary eligibility
in the range of 25–40 percent (Table 1).
These studies also cite voluntary quits
and employer discharges as likely reasons
for failure of nonmonetary eligibility
rules.
UI Benefit Receipt
Among TANF leavers who were UI
applicants in the sample pooled across

four states, the proportion receiving
UI benefits was 50 percent. This rate
is higher than the overall nonmonetary
eligibility rate because benefit denials
can be appealed and the periods of
entitlement suspension are limited. In
these four states denial penalties range
from 6 to 17 weeks in a 52-week benefit
year. Among TANF leavers who qualified
for UI, mean weekly benefit amounts
were $159, mean entitled durations
of UI benefits were 19.6 weeks, and
on average 74.6 percent of entitled UI
benefits were drawn. Mean UI payments
were $2,442 over the full benefit year,
or a mean of 14.5 weeks of UI at the
average weekly benefit amount for this
sample. Benefit entitlements were fully
exhausted by 53 percent of TANF-leaver
UI beneficiaries, which is a higher rate
of UI benefit exhaustion than among UI
beneficiaries not recently involved with
TANF in the same time frame. TANF
leaver UI beneficiaries are more likey to
be older, male, white, and Hispanic, with
higher proportions from the construction
and manufacturing industries and
smaller proportions from the retail trade,
health care, and hospitality industries.
By occupation, UI recipients included
higher proportions from management,
professional, and production occupations
and smaller proportions from service
occupations. A previous study of New
Jersey welfare leavers estimated a
beneficiary rate of 56 percent among UI
applicants (Rangarajan, Razafindrakoto,
and Corson 2002).
UI and Self-Sufficiency
A goal of UI as social insurance is to
prevent descent into poverty by those
who are temporarily jobless through
no fault of their own. We examine selfsufficiency in the sense of return to
employment and independence from
TANF cash assistance. Of the 241,719
newly unemployed TANF leavers in
the four-state pooled sample, those
who received UI benefits returned to
employment at a slightly higher rate than
those who did not receive benefits (74
percent versus 73 percent). Furthermore,
UI beneficiaries returned to TANF at
a significantly lower rate (30 percent)
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Table 1 Survey of Estimates for Welfare Leavers of Percentage Rates for UI Eligibility and Benefit Receipt
Authors

Samples

Monetarily
UI eligible

Nonmonetarily
UI eligible

Beneficiary
of UI

Up to 85

About 25

About 10

Gustafson and Levine (1997)

National Longitudinal Survey of Youth. Data from 1979 to 1994
on 43,913 job separations, including 4,213 by AFDC leavers.

Vroman (1998)

Data for 1996 UI state wage and earnings, state UI recipiency
and eligibility rates, for part-time minimum wage jobs.

—

—

Up to 20

Holzer (2000)

Data on 1997–1999 employment and earnings of hired welfare
recipients in a survey of 3,000 employers in four large American
cities.

—

—

Under 30

Kaye (2001)

Survey of Program Dynamics data for the year 2000 on 56,000
persons. Simulated UI eligibility for those at risk of welfare
receipt.

81

36

25

Rangarajan, Razafindrakoto,
and Corson (2002)

New Jersey data from the Work First NJ evaluation tracking
2,000 TANF beneficiaries in the 18 months starting July 1997.

75

40

56

Rangarajan and
Razafindrakoto (2004)

National Evaluation of Welfare-to-Work grants in 5
metropolitan counties. TANF leavers, September 1999 to
August 2000. Metro sample sizes from 1,000 to 15,000.

90

—

—

O’Leary and Kline (2008)

State program administrative data for UI, ES, and TANF
between 1996 and 2002. State (number of calendar quarters):
Florida (10), Georgia (23), Michigan (5), and Ohio (6).
Combined sample size: 322,036.

87

44

50

NOTE: — = not available.

than did nonbeneficiaries (45 percent).
Among TANF leavers who applied for
UI benefits, controlling for observable
characteristics in econometric models,
those who received UI returned to
employment at a rate higher by 4.8
percentage points and returned to TANF
at a rate lower by 10.5 percentage points.
Use of the Employment Service
One-stop career centers operating
under the Workforce Investment Act
deliver reemployment services divided
into three increasing levels of service:
core, intensive, and training. Core and
intensive services at one-stops are often
delivered by the ES with Wagner-Peyser
Act funding. Participants typically use
core services before progressing to
intensive or training services. Using
data from Georgia, we examined the
use of Wagner-Peyser Act–funded ES
services by newly unemployed TANF
leavers and measured the correlations
between ES usage and labor market
outcomes, controlling for the degree of
UI involvement.
The data show that large proportions
of newly unemployed TANF leavers used

the ES. Among these, sizable numbers
of UI nonapplicants used ES services,
but usage rates were significantly higher
among UI applicants. Importantly, ES
usage rates were similar between UI
beneficiaries and nonbeneficiary UI
applicants, suggesting that application
for UI is a pathway to reemployment
services provided by the ES, even if
cash UI benefits are not forthcoming.
The usage of ES by all Georgia residents
who left TANF between the second
quarter of 1996 and the fourth quarter
of 2001 is summarized in Figure 1.
Service use was examined from one
quarter before through one quarter after
TANF exit, new unemployment, and
application for UI. The ES was used
by 21 percent of all the 152,278 TANF
leavers in Georgia, including 26 percent
of the 123,424 who experienced a new
spell of unemployment after TANF
exit. Among the newly unemployed, 76
percent of the 27,166 who applied for UI
benefits and 14 percent of the 96,254 UI
nonapplicants used ES. Among the UI
applicants, 78 percent of the 13,335 UI
beneficiaries and 77 percent of the 15,295
ineligible UI applicants used ES. While
usage rates were lower across the board

for intensive services, a similar pattern
of usage can be seen across the UI usage
groups. A key contrast is the substantially
higher rate of usage for both core and
intensive services by ineligible UI
applicants compared to UI nonapplicants.
Employment Services and
Self-Sufficiency
For our samples of newly unemployed
TANF leavers in Georgia, econometric
models controlling for UI receipt and
observable characteristics suggest that ES
use helps to maintain connections with
employment opportunities, particularly
for the working poor. This appears
to be true regardless of the degree
of involvement with UI and, despite
the fact that UI applicants use the ES
more often, this result still holds for
UI nonapplicants. Additionally there is
evidence that use of services through
the ES reduces rates of complete TANF
dependency and inactivity.
Before this study, there has been no
research on ES use by TANF leavers
in the United States. However, a recent
Canadian field experiment found that
while financial incentives alone did
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Figure 1 Usage Rates of Employment Services by TANF Leavers in Georgia, by UI
Application Status
0.8
0.7

Kelleen. Kaye. 2001. “Re-Examining
Unemployment Insurance as a Potential
Safety Net for Workers at Risk of Public
Assistance Receipt.” Prepared for the
“America’s Workforce Network Research
Conference,” held in Washington, DC,
June 26–27.

0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.2
0.1
0
TANF leavers Newly jobless Nonapplicants UI applicants UI beneficiaries UI ineligibles
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not result in significant reductions in
welfare dependency, when combined
with reemployment services, the financial
incentives yielded large and statistically
significant reductions in rates of welfare
receipt (Robins, Michalopolous, and
Foley 2008).
Summary
It is undeniable that TANF changed
welfare. Since TANF was introduced in
1996, welfare caseloads have declined
dramatically. While caseloads have
nearly vanished in some states, need
remains. Former TANF recipients and
others vulnerable to welfare dependency
are turning to multiple sources to replace
cash public assistance. The roles of
UI and ES for low-income Americans
in a post-TANF economy should be
better understood. The degree to which
this population is served under current
arrangements needs to be documented.
We must also learn about the extent to
which initiatives of UI modernization
and ES revitalization under the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act broaden
the effectiveness of these programs
for our most vulnerable households.
Additionally, we should identify federal
and state program changes to make these
institutions accessible, sustainable, and
more compatible for employers and job
seekers in competitive labor markets.
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Happens When the Recession Comes?
New Federalism: Issues and Options for
States No. A-46. Washington, DC: The
Urban Institute.

Intensive services

In the aggregate, TANF leavers
constitute a small and declining share
of all UI beneficiaries. While TANF
leavers have higher UI exhaustion rates
than non-TANF-leaver UI beneficiaries,
they also have significantly lower
initial entitled UI benefit durations. The
recent recession saw an increased share
of UI beneficiaries from high-wage
professional and technical occupations.
In 2009, the number of TANF leavers
declined to be less than 3 percent of all
Georgia UI beneficiaries and an even
smaller share of UI benefit payment
costs. However, for TANF leavers who
receive UI and ES services, these are
lifelines to continued self-sufficiency and
labor force attachment.
Note
1. Differences and point estimates
discussed in this article were all estimated with
statistical precision exceeding the 95 percent
level of confidence in two-tailed tests.)
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Joel P. Trachtman

The Political Economy
of International Labor
Migration Law
T

rade specialists look at the field
of migration and often ask, “Why are
there so few international commitments
to liberalize movement of workers,
compared to the extensive commitments
that exist to liberalize trade in goods?”
Goods are usually single purchase events
and do not broadly entail a continuing
relationship between buyer and seller.
Even services, while entailing more
complex and durable relationships
than a purchase of goods, are relatively
unidimensional. Individuals, on the other
hand, are multidimensional, and their
movement as workers involves longterm relationships of great complexity
with governments and with employers.
Migration specialists often refer to the
aphorism attributed to the Swiss author
Max Frisch: “We imported workers
and got people instead” (Borjas 2007).
People come with cultures and skills,
and they grow up in dense familial and
social networks. They have spouses
and children. They need education,
health care, political engagement, and
all of the other fruits of society. They
bear responsibilities to society as well,
including taxes and perhaps military
service. So, as we discuss migration, we
must recognize that it requires breaking
and restructuring many relationships:
a costly endeavor in the deepest sense.
Yet despite these costs, large numbers of
people today seem eager to move.
However, there are substantial
barriers in place to prevent these people
from achieving their desires to move
in order to seek a better life. These
barriers demean human welfare. So it
seems worthwhile to grapple with the
complexity in order to evaluate whether
and how to unlock substantial welfare
gains. Individuals will only decide to

undertake migration if they perceive that
it is worthwhile to them. Throughout
history, some have decided to do so,
while many others have not. But we must
also recognize that there are costs and
benefits that are external to the individual
migrant. The migrant may be permitted
to decide whether to accept these costs
and benefits for his or her own family,
but what about costs and benefits of the
migrant’s decision that are felt by the
migrant’s former compatriots, or by the
migrant’s new hosts?
The role of international law, in
this as in other contexts, is to allow

The gains from total trade
liberalization are estimated
at $155 billion annually, while
the gains from a 3 percent
increase in the stock of
migrants is $175 billion.
states to constrain themselves where
their unregulated action would be less
desirable than action constrained by
international law. International law has
not broadly responded to state restraints
on immigration. There are a number of
reasons why there is little international
law addressing such state restraints. One
reason is that these restraints are fairly
recent.
The United States, which was once
a nation of immigrants, only began to
restrict immigration in 1875, and then
restrictions were limited to those who
were destitute, engaged in immoral
activities, or physically handicapped
(Neuman 1993, p. 1883). This restriction
seems to be intended to protect the
public fisc, as opposed to jobs. The
U.S. Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882

responded to concerns about competition
from cheap immigrant labor, as well as
racism. In fact, throughout the history
of immigration restrictions we see the
influence of both protectionism and
racism. However, the late nineteenth
century was still a period of effectively
liberal policies toward migration.
Roughly 60 million Europeans emigrated
to the New World between 1820 and
1914. This liberalism ended in the
imposition of country-of-origin quotas
during the early twentieth century
(O’Rourke 2004).
During the early twentieth century,
many popular destination states began
to establish restrictions on immigration.
During the past 60 years, global society
has made important strides toward free
movement of goods, money, and even
some types of services. Yet human
migration for economic and noneconomic
reasons remains broadly constrained.
The book The International Law of
Economic Migration: Toward the Fourth
Freedom, recently published by the
Upjohn Institute (see p. 7), explores the
law and policy of international economic
migration. It analyzes the economics
and politics of migration in order to
assess the fit between the legal rules
and institutions that presently exist to
govern international economic migration,
and the goal of maximizing welfare. In
fact, there are practically no multilateral
international legal rules regulating
migration for economic purposes. This
work shows that, in order to establish
the domestic and international political
conditions for welfare-enhancing
liberalization of migration, it may
be necessary to establish binding
international legal agreements regarding
liberalization.
The gains from total trade
liberalization, according to a recent
World Bank study, are estimated at
$155 billion annually, while the gains
from a 3 percent increase in the stock
of migrants is $175 billion (World Bank
2006, p. 41). Not only does migration
reform provide greater aggregate gains,
but the gains are distributed more greatly
to developing countries. No wonder
thoughtful observers ask why economic
migration is not on the global agenda.
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It seems reasonable to conclude that
liberalization of migration presents the
possibility of substantial improvement
of global welfare, even though these are
only estimates, with many assumptions
and empirical gaps. However, the devil
is in the details of the distribution of
increased (and decreased) welfare, and
in the political consequences of these
distributional details.
So, why do we see very little
diplomatic activity toward international
legal commitments for liberalization of
economic migration? Why do we see
few initiatives by states to unilaterally
liberalize immigration, which would
often have beneficial economic effects?
Is the political economy story of
international migration like the story of
international trade, in which international
legal commitments are useful to provide
reciprocal incentives for exporters
to lobby, alongside consumers, for
lower import duties? We see a few
regional or preferential agreements for
liberalization—most notably, and most
successfully, those within the EU and
between Australia and New Zealand. We
see almost no such agreements between
wealthy countries and poor countries.
Why?
Less-skilled workers from developed
countries will rarely wish to migrate: they
are likely to reduce their income if they
go to a poor country, and they cannot
improve their income much by moving to
a developed country. On the other hand,
it is difficult to adapt to a new culture,
language, and lifestyle.
Skilled workers from developed
countries may wish to migrate to other
developed countries, and often this is
permitted, although economic downturns
seem to reduce the interest in immigrants.
Skilled workers from developed countries
have not sought work in developing
countries in large numbers, presumably
because they can earn a greater income
in developed countries, which have more
complementary factors to make them
more productive.
Skilled workers from developing
countries often wish to migrate to
developed countries for the same reason:
complementary factors in wealthy
countries would allow them to increase
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their productivity and therefore increase
their incomes. Policies in developed
countries vary, but until the recent
economic crisis there were important
initiatives to facilitate immigration of
skilled workers. Skilled workers would
generally be expected to increase the
welfare of the destination state.
Basic economic theory would
suggest that migration of less-skilled
workers from where they are abundant—
developing countries—to where they are
relatively scarce—developed countries—
would increase general welfare. However,
there are two major concerns. First,
there is continuing debate regarding the
extent to which less-skilled workers in
the destination state experience reduced
wages because of immigration of
competing workers. Second, there is still
some debate regarding the extent to which
developing home states may experience
reduced welfare due to “brain drain.”

There is debate regarding
the extent to which less-skilled
workers in the destination
state experience reduced wages
because of immigration of
competing workers.
Remittances and return migration may
reduce the negative effects of brain drain.
If a multilateral framework
agreement existed within which states
could negotiate specific liberalization
commitments regarding immigration,
perhaps including reciprocal exchanges
for liberalization in other areas such as
investment or trade in goods or services,
it is likely that states would more easily
reach specific agreements that enhance
welfare. It is also possible that enough
enhanced welfare could be generated to
compensate any less-skilled workers in
the destination state who are adversely
affected, or to compensate the home state
for any adverse effects of brain drain.
There are many questions that
would be relevant to the structure of an
international agreement providing for
liberalization of economic migration.
Would this agreement provide for
nondiscrimination among home

countries, or would it be possible for
states to make special bilateral or
plurilateral commitments? Should
permission to immigrate be temporary
or permanent? How would immigrants
be treated in terms of local taxes, social
security, health care, access for family
members, and inclusion in the political
community? These collateral issues could
operate as inducements or deterrents to
migration. Under what circumstances,
such as a recession, may the destination
state reduce its commitments? Would
an organization be needed? Could the
International Organization on Migration,
the World Trade Organization, the
United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development, the International Labor
Organization, or a new organization, best
perform the requisite functions?
It would be worthwhile for states to
examine these issues, as their resolution
could allow states to unlock great
amounts of increased welfare, to increase
the liberty of individuals to move, and
to reduce global income inequality. The
International Law of Economic Migration
can inform this examination.
References
Borjas, George. 2007. “On Guest
Workers.” The Borjas Blog. http://borjas.
typepad.com/the_borjas_blog/2007/05/
on_guest_worker.html (accessed
February 3, 2008).
Neuman, Gerald L. 1993. “The Lost
Century of Immigration Law (1776–
1875).” Columbia Law Review 93(8):
1833–1901.
O’Rourke, Kevin H. 2004. “The Era of
Free Migration: Lessons for Today.” IIIS
Discussion Paper 18. Dublin: Institute for
International Integration Studies.
World Bank. 2006. Global Economic
Prospects: Economic Implications of
Remittances and Migration. Washington,
DC: World Bank.
Joel P. Trachtman is a professor of
international law at the Fletcher School of
Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University.

